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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The impact of the present case will undoubtedly produce a different
aproach by parties seeking to avoid liability on fraudulently secured
negotiable instruments. The decision has effectively cut off any possi-
bility of defending successfully against the holder who took the instru-
ment in good faith and in exchange for a negotiable instrument.
But when a fact situation arises involving an exchange of negotiable
instruments, where one is subject to a prior infirmity, the following ap-
proach may be useful in setting up a valid defense, assuming the possi-
bility that the Wisconsin Court will modify its flat rejection of the Jerke
rationale. Unless the transferee knew of the fraud at the time of the
exchange, his right to recover should not be questioned by merely
asserting N.I.L. 54, or by questioning the transferee's holder in due
course status. Rather, the defendant should proceed to establish:
1. The point in time at which the plaintiff was aware of the infirmity;
2. That plaintiff's negotiable instrument was subsequently paid to one
not a holder in due course; and most important,
3. That plaintiff knew the payee was not a holder in due course.
In essence the defendant would be arguing the supervening equity
of the situation, 24 and denial of recovery would be predicated upon the
plaintiff's participation in effectuating the fraud, irrespective of his due
course status at the completion of the original transaction.
MICHAEL R. WHERRY
Wills-Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence in the Absence of
Ambiguity: The wills of Mr. and Mrs. George Gibbs each be-
queathed one per cent of the residue to "Robert J. Krause, now of
4708 North 46th Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin." Robert W. Krause,
who resided at 2325 North Sherman Boulevard at the time the will
was executed, petitioned the County Court for. Milwaukee County
for construction of the above provisions on the ground that he was
the intended beneficiary. Both Robert J. Krause of 4708 North 46th
Street and Robert W. Krause were represented at the hearing. The
petitioner was permitted to introduce evidence that he was a close
friend and former employee of the decedents, over the objection of
the named beneficiary. He was also allowed to show that in prior
24 In Home Savings Bank v. General Finance Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 417, 103 N.W.
2d 117 (1960), the Wisconsin Court allowed a restitutional recovery to a
plaintiff who relied upon the oral acceptance of a sight draft. N.I.L. 132,
Wis. STAT. §118.07 (1959), requires a bill of exchange to be accepted in
writing. Yet the Court felt that the inequity of the situation justified relief
even though the plaintiff was seemingly barred by the express wording of
the N.I.L. It is interesting to note that principles in another field of law,
restitution, took precedence over the more particular area, negotiable in-
struments.
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wills, identical bequests had been made to "Robert Krause of Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin."
Robert J. Krause testified that at the time of the execution of the
will, he was the only person by that name residing at 4708 North 46th
Street. He also stated that while working as a taxi driver he had trans-
ported an elderly lady across the city, that he had given her his name,
and that he had related his financial difficulties to her.
Upon this evidence, the County Court concluded that petitioner
Robert W. Krause was the intended beneficiary, and orders were ac-
cordingly entered. The Supreme Court, taking judicial notice that the
addresses of the two claimants are in the same general direction of
Milwaukee, that both are a number of miles from the Gibbs' home, and
that the telephone directory listed 14 subscribers by the name of Robert
Krause, affirmed, with two dissents. Estate of Gibbs.'
The decision and opinion in this case mark a departure from prior
Wisconsin law of will construction. Although the court stated that there
was no ambiguity because "the terms of the bequest exactly fit appellant
and no one else, ' 2 appellant was not given the bequest. Rather, it was
awarded to the person to whom the court found it was intended to go.
Extrinsic evidence was admitted to establish this intent despite the ab-
sence of any ambiguity in the will.
Prior to the Gibbs case, when no ambiguity existed the courts were
bound to apply the intent of the testator as it was expressed in the will.
Where there was a conflict between the intent expressed in the will and
the intent as established by extrinsic evidence, the former was given
effect.3 The same policy reasons that prompted statutes requiring wills
to be in writing were thought to require that the will be applied as it was
written.4 Even if extrinsic evidence could be presented which would
clearly indicate that a mistake was made, and that the person or property
named in the will was not the intended beneficiary, in the absence of an
ambiguity the words in the will would be applied as written. Also the
fact that the mistake may have been occasioned by the scrivener instead
of the testator did not affect the application of the rule. 6
Since an unambiguous will could not be altered by extrinsic evidence
of a contrary intent, such evidence was inadmissible in a proceeding for
construction because of immateriality. It could not be used to attempt
'. 14 Wis. 2d 490, 111 N.W. 2d 413 (1961).
2 Id. at 497.
3 Will of Boeck, 160 Wis. 577, 152 N.W. 155 (1915) ; Will of Cuppel, 206 Wis.
586, 240 N.W. 144 (1932); Will of Tousey, 260 Wis. 150, 50 N.W. 2d 454
(1951); 2 GARY, WISCONSIN PROBATE LAW §§595-97 (5th ed. 1944); Anno.
94 A.L.R. 26, 68, 77-78.
4 Estate of Pierce, 177 Wis. 104, 188 N.W. 78 (1922); Anno. 94 A.L.R. 26, 65.
5 Estate of Gray, 265 Wis. 217, 61 N.W. 2d 467 (1953).
6 Estate of Gray, supra note 5; Anno. 94 A.L.R. 26, 38, 70.
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to establish the fact that a mistake was made, nor to show what the
testator's actual intent was.7
As has been indicated, this rule applied only where there was no
ambiguity. Where an ambiguity did exist, the courts could resort to
extrinsic proof of the testator's intent to resolve it. An ambiguity can be
either patent or latent. A patent ambiguity is one that appears on the
face of the instrument itself. When a will is insensible and contradicts
itself, it is deemed to have such a defect.8 Technically a will cannot be
said to contain a latent ambiguity because it does not appear on the face
of the instrument. 9 The will is apparently unambiguous, but when the
court attempts to apply it to the designated property or beneficiaries,
the defect appears. There are two general circumstances when this sit-
uation arises. In the first the description used in the will is unintelligible
with reference to any existing object or person.10 The second is when
the description accurately applies to two or more persons or things.11
In any case where such defects appear the court can receive extrinsic
evidence. Aided by this evidence, the court then can determine which
person or property the will intended to describe, and give effect to that
intent. 12 This the court can do even if part of the description is false.
Thus, if there had been no Robert J. Krause at 4708 North 46th Street,
the court could have omitted the initial and address from the description
and given the request to the Robert Krause of Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
intended by the testator and testatrix under thd doctrine of falsa dem-
onstratio non nocet.
1 3
Of course, some extrinsic evidence is admissible in every case in
order to apply the bequest to the described property or person,14 but
this is limited to only such evidence as is necessary to execute the will
i.e., apply its terms to existing facts. If no ambiguity appears upon this
bare application of the will to the facts, then the will must be executed
strictly in accordance with its terms.15
Thus it would seem that under this interpretation of the law, the
petitioner could only be given relief if the court found some sort of
7Estate of Breese, 7 Wis. 2d 422, 96 N.W. 2d 712 (1959); Estate of Gray,
supra note 5; 2 GARY, supra note 3, §598; 95 C.J.S. Wills §639; Anno.
94 A.L.R. 26, 31.
s Will of Stack, 214 Wis. 98, 251 N.W. 470, 92 A.L.R. 150 (1934); Will of
Boeck, 160 Wis. 577, 152 N.W. 155 (1915) ; Will of Frost, 3 Wis. 2d 603, 89
N.W. 2d 216 (1958) ; Estate of Grove, 6 Wis. 2d 659, 95 N.W. 2d 788 (1959);
Estate of Witwer, 253 Wis. 536, 34 N.W. 2d 671 (1948).
9 See Estate of Grove, supra note 8.10 Will of Boeck, 160 Wis. 577, 152 N.W. 155 (1915) ; Anno. 94 A.L.R. 26, 43.
11 Will of Boeck, supra note 10.
12 Estate of Witwer, 253 Wis. 536, 34 N.W. 2d 671 (1948).
13Anno. 94 A.L.R. 26, 74.
14 Will of Frost, 3 Wis. 2d 603, 89 N.W. 2d 216 (1958) ; Anno. 94 A.L.R. 26, 43,
52.15 Anno. 94 A.L.R. 26, 54.
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ambiguity, and in fact this is the way the parties argued the case. Rob-
ert W. Krause claimed that
. .. a latent ambiguity was necessarily raised in the instant case
by the filing of verified petitions for construction of the wills in
question on the part of respondent which tended to show his
closer relationship to the testator and testatrix than the appellant
bore to them, and the probability of a mistake in identification
having been made with respect to the subject of the bequests
under consideration.' 6
The Supreme Court found no ambiguity, but nevertheless, refused
to grant the property to the named beneficiary. As authority for its de-
cision the court cited two Wisconsin cases and several other decisions.
The court stated that in decisions such as these the courts have "strained"
the strict rule against reformation in the areas of description of per-
sons and property in order to reach "desired" results.
The Wisconsin cases cited are Will of Stack17 and Will of Boeck.' s
These cases involved property descriptions. In the former the testator
willed "all my real estate ... in block 64." When the court attempted
to apply this language to the property in question it appeared that ad-
joining the lot in question was another situated in block 175. These two
lots had constituted a unit for many years, and the use of the buildings
thereon would be destroyed if only one were intended to be conveyed.
Thus the court said, "When we apply the will to the property under
consideration, the result gives rise to an ambiguity.... This ambiguity
gives rise to the necessity of construction. . . ." In the Boeck case,
the will devised the northeast quarter of the northwest quarter of sec-
tion 13. In fact the testator did not own that land, but did own the south-
west quarter of the same quartersection, which property was not other-
wise disposed of by his will. The court stated that since, by the terms
of the will, the testator intended to devise 40 acres, and since he did not
own the 40 acres described, an uncertainty of meaning arose by the
application of the will to the subject matter. Thus, extrinsic evidence of
intent could be resorted to to resolve it. In the Wisconsin cases cited,
then, the court required an ambiguity before extrinsic evidence of in-
tent was admissible. The finding of an ambiguity may have been a
"straining" of the law, but it was at least arguable that one actually did
exist, and the court recognized that it could not resort to construction
without it.
In the comparable cases from other jurisdictions the courts made
16 Brief for the Respondent, p. 12, Estate of Gibbs, 14 Wis. 2d 490, 111 N.W. 2d
413 (1961).
17214 Wis. 98, 251 N.W. 470, 92 A.L.R. 150 (1934).
18 160 Wis. 577, 152 N.W. 155 (1915).
'19 Will of Stack, 214 Wis. 98, 251 N.W. 470, 92 A.L.R. 150 (1934) at 102-103.
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similar findings. In Moseley v. Goodman20 and MV1iller's Estate21 there
were ambiguities because there were two persons known by the name
used in the will-one whose actual name was the one used, and the
other who was known to the testator by that name. In Beaumont v.
Feld2 and Masters v. Masters23 the ambiguity arose because there was
no person claiming the bequest by the name used in the will. In Groves
v. Culph24 the fact that the will manifested an intention that the daughter
have a remainder in the same property in which the mother had a life
estate, and that the mother had a life estate in both lots 15 and 16,
rendered the devise of a remainder in just lot 15 to the daughter am-
biguous. Ca.stell v. Tagg25 and Geer v. Winds26 are not cases of mistake
in identification, but rather complete omissions of intended bequests or
devises. Since the court limits its decision here to details of identifica-
tion,27 and since Wisconsin has not previously allowed extrinsic evi-
dence to supply omissions, 2 these decisions presumably would not be
followed by the Wisconsin court.
Therefore none of the prior authority cited has approved the
proposition that the court can refuse to apply an unambiguous will ac-
cording to its terms and resort to extrinsic evidence to discover the real
intent of the testator and give that intent effect. However, this is not
to say that the court should not have decided the case as it did. There
was no Wisconsin case directly in point forbidding the development of
an exception to the general rule. 29 The court evidently did not feel that
"the judicial hands were so tied to the rock of precedent that they could
not be so loosened as to do justice in the particular case."' 0
As the court stated, the result in the instant case is "desired" in that
the bequest is given to the person for whom it was intended, and the
stranger is not unjustly enriched. Although the former result could
possibly be obtained by an action against the attorney on a contract or
negligence theory3l (assuming that it could be established that this was
the cause of the mistake), the latter effect would not be obviated, and
there would be a more difficult burden of proof placed on the intended
beneficiary. The policy reasons for the opposite view are the same as
20 138 Tenn. 1, 195 S.W. 590 (1917).
2126 Pa. Super. Ct. 443 (1904).
2224 Eng. Rep. 673 (1723).
2324 Eng. Rep. 454 (1718).
24 132 Ind. 186, 31 N.E. 569 (1892).
25 163 Eng. Rep. 102 (1836).
284 S.C. Eq. (4 Desauss.) 84 (*85) (1810).
27 Supra note 1, at 497, 499.
28 2 GARY, supra note 3, §598 citing Sherwood v. Sherwood, 45 Wis. 357, 30 Am.
Rep. 757 (1878).
29 For cases in point in other jurisdictions, see Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Soc.,
7 Met. (Mass.) 188 (1843); Dunham v. Averill, 45 Conn. 61, 29 Am. Rep. 642
(1877), and other cases cited at 94 A.L.R. 77-79.
30 Will of Boeck, 160 Wis. 577, 580, 152 N.W. 155 (1915).
31 See Lucas v. Hamm, 15 Cal. 821, 364 P. 2d 685 (1961).
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for requiring the will formalities in general, i.e., to avoid fraud, un-
certainty, litigation, etc. 32 Some of these objections may be overcome by
requiring proof establishing to the "highest degree of certainty that a
mistake was, in fact, made."
The exception to the general rule created by this case is given two
limitations by the opinion of the court. The proof must establish to the
highest degree of certainty that a mistake was, in fact, made, and the
mistake must be as to some detail of identification. As to the first re-
quirement, the degree of certainty need not be absolute, because in the
instant case there was a possibility that the testator intended the taxi
driver as the beneficiary. Evidently more than a clear preponderance of
the evidence is necessary; however, as to details of identification, the
court only gives middle initials and addresses as examples. The prior
cases cited cannot be used to help define the limits of the new test since
they involved ambiguities. Once an ambiguity was shown, recovery was
allowed, whether the mistake was in a detail of identification or not,
and whether or not the proof of a mistake was established to the highest
degree of certainty. The precise limitations of the new test will there-
fore have to await further cases for a more complete definition.
ROBERT J. BONNER
Family Law-Annulment of Fraudulent Marriage Contract:
Plaintiff was intentionally induced to marry defendant by her false
representations of pregnancy based, in part, upon certificates exe-
cuted by a reputable local doctor stating the fact of pregnancy.
Following the ceremony and upon discovery that defendant was not
pregnant, plaintiff discontinued marital relations with her, re-
nounced her as his wife, left their residence, and commenced pro-
ceedings for annulment under Section 247.02(4) of the Wisconsin
Statutes.' Reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court granted
32 "The statute prescribing the manner in which wills shall be executed is in the
nature of a statute of frauds. Perhaps no other legal document requires such
solemnity in the manner of its execution. This is for the purpose of securing
the highest degree of assurance that the testator's property will go as he wills
it and to make it correspondingly difficult to divert it into other channels. To
permit this judgment to stand would open up an alluring field for frauds and
perjuries and neutralize to a great degree the safeguards which the statute
throws about the estates of deceased persons. It would permit anyone having
a claim against an estate of a deceased person, and being fraudulently dis-
posed, to manufacture evidence, . . . and the estate of the testator would not
go according to his written declaration executed in accordance with the
solemnities required by the statute but according to parol testimony produced
at a time when the testator cannot be present to refute it. While justice might
be done in the instant case, a recognition of such a rule would point the way
for contravention of a statute designed by the legislature to prevent the dis-
tribution of estates except in accordance with the will of the testator" Frieders
v. Estate of Frieders, 180 Wis. 430, 433-34, 193 N.W. 77, 31 A.L.R. 118 (1923).
'Wis. STAT. §247.02(4) (1959) :
".... A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes:...
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